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Mautz and Rock: The Wages of Management

THE WAGES OF MANAGEMENT
ROBERT B. MAUTZ and GERALD W. ROCK*

Historically, the corporation evolved from an initial desire to
collect private capital. The investment of shareholders seeking a
profit was supervised by hired managers; the managers were controlled
through annual stockholders' meetings or by stockholder representation in the form of a board of directors. Today, our modern corporate
system has become the institutional system for our national economy.1
Developing in larger and more impersonal units, the corporations
that dominate the economy are private only in the sense that they are
not owned by the state, 2 and they are influenced by social and political
patterns transcending their economic objectivesA
The corporations of today have succeeded not only in collecting
capital but in concentrating it; the familiar story of the 200 largest
corporations 4 and their control over 50% of all corporate wealth
has often been stated. More concretely, corporate size means that
"one hundred companies the size of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Co. would control all the wealth in the United States
[and] employ all the working population." 5
Who manages this vast concentration of public wealth; how
much compensation is paid to them; who controls the determination
of the amount of compensation; and what standards are used to
measure the price paid to management?6 These questions suggest
*Robert B. Mautz, B.A. 1937, Miami University (Ohio); LL.B. 1940, Yale University; Professor of Law, Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Florida.
Gerald W. Rock, B.A. 1953, University of Florida; student, College of Law,
University of Florida.
'BERLE,

THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION

2Id. at 12.

18

(1954).

For a businessman's view that corporation managers control public

entities and have a fiduciary role to the public, see Elfenbein. The Mid-Century
Decision Makers, in 16 VITAL SPEECHES 325 (1950).
3Drucker, The Future of the Corporation, 185 Harper's 644 (1942).
4
BERLE and MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 28-40

(1937).
5
Means, Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry, 46 Q.J.
ECON. 68, 97 (1931). In 1955 American Tel. & Tel. Co. had assets of $10,000,000,000
as compared with an estimated national wealth of $1,326,000,000,000. See MOODY'S
PUBLIC UTILITIES MANUAL 600

(1956); U. S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

319, Table 393 (1957).
6For a stimulating sociological and practical analysis of the problem of corpo-
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the purpose of this article: to summarize and contrast corporate compensation practices with traditional theories that are descriptive of
economic practice and legal control.
Berle and Means, in their classic work on American corporations,
have described traditional economic theory as the logic of property
and the logic of profits. 7 When both of these theories are applied
to modem corporate institutions, a conflict results. The logic of
property demands that owners who risk their wealth receive the
benefits resulting from that risk. As applied to corporations, the
shareholders should receive the benefits of ownership; management,
to whom the task of managing the property to produce a profit has
been delegated, holds its power in trust for the benefit of the shareholders. In contrast, the logic of profits is based upon a profit reward
as an inducement for skillful and efficient enterprise. Applied to
corporations, the logic of profits results in the distribution of profits
to management as an inducement to fulfill their function of efficient
enterprise.
Division of the functions of ownership and enterprise produces this
conflict in our theories when applied to economic activity. Most corporation reports emphasize both rationales to their shareholders when
reporting compensation policies. A condensed, slightly exaggerated
but typical report will read, "Your managers of your corporation are
pleased to announce that they have established an incentive compensation plan providing for additional compensation so that your
managers may share in the profits of your corporation created by their
skill, loyalty and enthusiasm."
COMPENSATION PRACTICES

Neither the policies of American corporations upon which compensation practices are based nor the amounts paid to management
are openly stated and discussed by American business beyond the
minimum reports required to comply with existing legislation.8 "Prior
to 1934 compensation practices and policies were shrouded in mystery
and considered too confidential to be discussed even at annual meetrate power by a former president of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. see BARNARD,
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE

(1950), ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

(1949).

7BERLE and MEANS, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 333-44.
8PurRDY, LINDAHL and CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 99

(2d ed. 1950); for a report on the strong corporate opposition to disclosures by
the SEC see Literary Digest, Apr. 20, 1935, p. 41.
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ings of stockholders who were legal owners." 9 Only the introduction
of securities legislation produced disclosure of corporate financial
data including compensation. Although the Securities and Exchange
Commission requires disclosure of the compensation of the three
highest paid executives and the total compensation of all officers and
directors for registration and proxy purposes, the amount of compensation of officers of corporations not required to register with the
commission is still generally unavailable.1° As late as 1951 Fortune
stated: "The hard fact is that in the majority of companies today
the paying of executives remains the most subjective and secretive of
all management operations."' 1
Some early studies indicate that the large compensation of today
is a recent development. Average payments in the decade 1904-1914
to the top three executives of corporations with capital in excess of
$1,500,000 was $9,958.12 The treatment of managerial executives by

financial owner and control groups prior to 1914 was, so Fortune
states, merely that of hired hands. 1 3 The average salary of the president of a large corporation was $10,000. Management, at that time,
indicated that profit-sharing plans, then prevalent in Europe, would
not produce greater corporate profits. 1 4 By 1929 industrial expansion

had placed the manager in an independent and therefore powerful
position resulting in an increase in salary levels to near the $100,000
range plus other compensation.' 5 It was in that year that Eugene
Grace of Bethlehem Steel received a salary of $12,000 and a bonus of
$1,623,700.16
Today, average compensation levels have risen from those of 1929.
Salaries are frequently but a small portion of total compensation,
which is swollen by bonuses based upon an incentive or profit-sharing
plan, stock options, retirement benefits, deferred payments, expense
accounts, perquisites, and other devices for compensating executives.
9BAKER, EXECUTIVE SALARIES AND BONUS PLANS 1

(1938).

IOThe effectiveness of the commission's disclosure requirements may be weakened
by various devices of evasion. Failure to offer stock through an exchange and
failure to hold stockholders' meetings are two examples.
"Stryker, How Much Is an Executive Worth?, Fortune, Apr. 1955, pp. 108, 110.
12Taussig and Barker, American Corporations and Their Executives, 40 Q.J.
ECON. 1, 19 (1925).

13Stryker, supra note 11, pp. 108, 109.

14Taussig and Barker, supra note 12, at 29.
15Stryker, supra note 11, p. 108.
16WASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING
(rev. ed. 1951).

THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
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A 1956 survey of 641 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange reported average compensation of the chief executive by industrial groups. Because it is mathematically incorrect to average
the averages, a few examples will have to be selected to indicate present levels. At a profit level of $40,000,000, average payments to the
chief executive of the corporation were as follows: in the aircraft
industry, $173,000; auto parts, $190,000; heavy machinery, $200,000;
public utilities, $105,000; steel, $202,000; textiles, $270,000."7 A profit
level of $3,000,000 produced compensation of approximately fifty per
cent of the above averages.
It is apparent from these averages that some variation in compensation levels among industries exists. This variation is also true for
earlier periods.' s Within industries there is often such a startling
disparity in compensation as to raise a doubt concerning the presence
of a competitive factor in the determination of compensation.
An examination of some corporations within an industry will indicate this variation. Three major steel corporations, in 1956, paid
widely different amounts of compensation judged either by absolute
amounts or as a percentage of assets, profits, or dividends. As the
table- indicates, the compensation of the three highest paid executives of Republic Steel and United States Steel was almost identical,
although Republic's assets were nearly $3,000,000,000 less, income
after taxes was only 26% of United States Steel's and dividends only
27%. Bethlehem Steel, with assets of 54% of U. S. Steel's, income after
taxes of 46% and dividends of 57%, paid compensation equal to
282% of that paid by U. S. Steel.

Corporation
Republic
Bethlehem
U. S. Steel

Assets

Income
Before
Taxes

Income
After
Taxes

S 857,000,000 $185,000,000 S 90,000,000
2,090,000,000
3,836,000,000

321,000,000
693,000,000

161,000,000
348,000,000

Dividends
$ 41,000,000
82,000,000
145,000,000

Compensation to
Three
Highest
Executives

$ 701,000
1,988,000
734,000

7

1 Patton, Annual Report on Executive Compensation, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.Oct. 1957, p. 125. One might contrast these figures with the median salary of
presidents of state universities, which in 1953 was $15,000. Natl Educ. Ass'n Res.
Bull., Dec. 1953.
28A 1935 survey of 264 executives showed average compensation to be as follows:
industrials $79,200, public utilities $48,600, railroads $40,600. GoPDoN, BUSINESS
LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION

275 (1945).

OCompiled from MooDY's INDUsrIAL
Business Week, May 25, 1957, pp. 113 et seq.

MANUAL
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A similar comparison can be made for retail stores. With assets
of $508,000,000, Woolworth's returned an income after taxes of
$35,000,000 and declared $25,000,000 in dividends;20 Penney's S403,000,000 of assets produced an income after taxes of $47,000,000 and
dividends of $35,000,000.21 Penney's paid its top executive $105,000,22
and Woolworth's paid compensation of $222,000 to its chief execugive.23

This extreme range of salaries is a constant occurrence. An earlier
study displayed this same variation in 51 large industrial corporations
with average assets of $178,000,000. Measured as a percentage of
earnings, compensation of policy-making executives averaged 2.9% in
1929 and 4.9%lo for the years 1928 through 1936. However, the variation of the percentage of compensation paid by corporations ranged
from 0.5% to 16.6% in 1929 and 0.8% to 41.9% for the 1928-1936
period.2 4 This variation was attributed to a lack of attention and
knowledge of directors. 25 This same variation has continued in post26

war years.

Another approach to compensation levels and their relationships
is to examine the list of executives receiving bonuses of over S250,000
a year. Fortune reports that there were thirty-six executives in that
category in 1955.2 7 Of these thirty-six, twelve were employed by General Motors, and their aggregate salaries and bonuses totaled
$6,266,000.28 Ten executives of Bethelehem Steel divided a total of
$4,459,000. Seven duPont executives received $2,904,000, and four
Ford executives earned $2,110,000. These figures account for thirtythree of the thirty-six executives.
A comparison of assets, earnings, and dividends of the corporations
employing these executives reveals variations that cast some doubt on
the incentive factor of compensation, at least in the sense that in some
corporations more economic results are required to achieve a specified income than in others. The net income of General Motors for
1955 was $1,189,477,082.29
Bethelehem's net income was over
2oMoODY'S

INDUSTRIAL MANUAL

1605 (1957).

-'Id. at 1625.
22Business Week, May 25, 1957, p. 113.
0- bid.
24BAKER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 238.
25Id. at 243.
2

6BLACKE=r, MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION 36 (1953).
27Dec. 1956, p. 130.
-8This is not necessarily the total compensation received by these executives.
29MooDY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2509 (1956).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 3
THE WA GES OF MANAGEMENT
$1,000,000,000 smaller: $180,191,708.30 However, the incentive compensation plan of each corporation produced income of approximately equal size to its executives. The income of the ten General
Motors executives equaled 0.9% of the declared dividends, that of
the ten Bethelehem executives 6.4% of Bethelehem's dividends. U. S.
Steel, with a net income of $761,000,000 compared with Bethelehem's
$180,000,000, did not have a single executive among the top thirtysix receiving the largest bonuses.
Litigation in prior years focused attention on extreme cases in
which compensation levels seemingly bore no relation to profit or
return on capital and exceeded the incentive function. For example,
during a seventeen-year period twenty executives of Bethlehem Steel
Corporation received a total compensation of $31,000,000 compared
with total dividends for the period of $44,000,000.31 During a fouryear period in which no common stock dividends were declared, although net income totaled $68,000,000, the executives of Bethlehem
received $6,800,000 in compensation.32
In another case, that of the General Motors bonus system introduced in 1923 and terminated in 1929, a corporation, Managers'
Securities Company, was established to receive 5% of the net income
of General Motors in excess of a 7% return on invested capital. The
shares of this corporation were sold to General Motors executives,
who then received the benefits of the new corporation. Since the
Managers' Securities Company invested in General Motors stock,
which pyramided in value during the 1920's, an investment of $50,000
in 1923 entitled the executive to receive cash and stock worth
$2,500,000 at the termination of the plan in 1929.33 Ford Motor
Company recently provided a similar compensation device by permitting thirteen executives to own all the stock of newly formed Dearborn Motors. Because of its relationship with Ford, this corporation
became quite profitable, and Time reported that "The Ford Motor
Company will soon buy up the stock of Dearborn Motors at a price
Sold. at 2614.
31132 NATION 669 (1931).
s21bid.
33WASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 115. Further examples
of compensation popularly regarded as excessive and public reaction to the revelation of amounts paid can be found in Literary Digest, July 29, 1933, p. 7; Oct.
28, 1933, p. 8; Dec. 9, 1933, p. 6; June 10, 1933, p. 8. For a report of corporate
opposition to the publication of compensation figures by the SEC see id. Apr. 20,
1935, p. 41.
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.
which will give the holders huge capital gains taxable at only 26%."
Ford also granted a stock option in 1953 to officers and directors,
which, based on the 1956 public offering of Ford stock, provided
35
paper profits of $41,500,000 for the group.
The relationship between compensation and dividends may be
viewed in another way. The salary and bonus of the president of
General Motors totaled $775,000 in 1955.36 The corporation's stock
closed at $46 a share at the end of that year 3 7 and dividends amounted
to $2.17. If a shareholder desired to receive an income equal to the
president's, he would need 357,140 shares of General Motors stock or
an investment of $16,428,440. Aspiring executives who might be disgruntled with the organizational procedures of large corporations were
38
reminded of a similar thought in an article in Nation's Business. It

was pointed out that the president of a large chain store corporation
who received $330,000 a year would, if he were in business for himself, need to invest $8,250,000 in order to receive his present income.
In addition, under the heading "Do You Still Get a Thrill out of
Competition?" it was observed that once one had established such a
business, receiving income would simply be a matter of keeping the
doors unlocked in contrast to the earning of a corporate salary, which,
based upon corporate competition, involves the only real competition
surviving today.
Except within the broadest ranges, compensation appears not to
be related in any discernible manner to gross income of the corporation, amount of profits, dividends paid, capital invested, or the amount
of money required to motivate economic man.
Methods of Compensation
The methods of payment to executives are varied. Current payments may be made by salary, bonus (cash or stock), profit sharing,
stock options, and stock purchases. Deferred compensation can be in
all of the above forms in addition to pensions, annuities, and insurance purchased for the executive. Salaries may be deferred by
the use of the future service consultant device, which provides for
34Time, May 18, 1953, p. 105.
35Rothschild, Financing Stock Purchases by Executives, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.Apr. 1957, p. 136.
a6Fortune, Dec. 1956, p. 130.
37New York Times, Dec. 31, 1955, p. 20.
3SOct. 1947, p. 39.
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payment after retirement on condition that the executive remain
available for consultation. 9 A 1956 survey of 641 corporations listed
on the major stock exchanges indicated that 90% provided retirement
plans for the chief executive, 26% offered some form of deferred income, and stock option plans were offered by 55% of the companies.40
Stock options and purchases may be financed in ingenious ways.
For example, a corporation may sell stock to its executive, who may
borrow the purchase price from the corporation. The executive's
stock is returned to the corporation to secure the loan, and the dividends produced by the stock are used to discharge the indebtedness.
This transaction is often accompanied by an agreement that the
corporation may repurchase the stock at the original price if the
executive leaves the employment of the corporation; an understanding
may also exist that should the stock fall in price the corporation will
not press the executive for payment of the loan.
Without an exhaustive study of material on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission it is impossible to determine the
amount of executive compensation paid by these different devices.
All that can be done here is to indicate some of the characteristics
of each method of compensation and, because of their complexity, the
difficulties that shareholders may have in evaluating these plans. For
example, the General Motors bonus plan introduced in 1923 involved four corporations and a variety of contracts. Managers' Securities Company was incorporated and sold $5,000,000 worth of its
class A and class B stock to General Motors. This money and
$28,800,000 worth of preferred stock were paid to E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. in exchange for the delivery from duPont of the 148,509
shares of its subsidiary, General Motors Securities Company, representing 2,250,000 shares of General Motors stock. General Motors
contracted to pay to Managers' Securities Company 5% of the net
earnings of General Motors per year after deducting from the earnings
an amount equal to 7% of the employed capital. General Motors
then sold the class A and class B stock of Managers' Securities Company
to 70 selected executives. 41 This is the plan by which an investment
of $50,000 by an executive in 1923 produced an estimated $2,500,000
39See examples

in WAsmNcroN and ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 543-59.
OPatton, supra note 17.
4IlMallery v. Managers' Securities Co., 1 F. Supp. 942, 943 (D. Del. 1932). See
4

Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1952), for a recent

case involving an expense account.
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in 1929.42 This plan was conceived "for arousing and sustaining the
zeal, enthusiasm, fidelity, and loyalty of managing executives of" General Motors. 43 The Ford plan involved compensation through the
appreciation of the stock, owned by Ford executives, of Dearborn
Motors; the latter corporation owed its profitability to its relationship
with Ford.
The use of deferred compensation plans permits tax savings to
executives if payments are received at a time when the executive's
income is subject to a lower taxable rate. Frequently the saving to
the executive is at the expense of a tax saving to the corporation and
hence is to the detriment of the shareholders. Plans most advantageous
to the executive, permitting deferment of taxable income to later
years, frequently preclude the corporation from deducting from its
income the payments in the current year, and sometimes even in the
year when compensation is paid.44 The use of such plans is reported
to have increased greatly from 1927 to 1947.4 5 Over 900 corporations
of 1,087 listed on the New York Stock Exchange reported the use of
4
deferred compensation plans for executives. r
The extensive use of these plans counteracts the idea that the size
of payments to executives is an inconsequential problem because of
high rates of taxation. Management has available many methods of
The argument
providing compensation with reduced tax liability.
that the current high rate of individual tax in the upper income
brackets provides a built-in safeguard against managerial desire for
increased compensation has little factual basis. The growth of deferred compensation plans along with other devices for placing retainable income in the hands of management demonstrates that
taxation does not limit total compensation; it merely changes the
techniques of reward. Also, deferred compensation plans may be a
motivation for management to seek higher salaries, even though the
bulk of the increase may be paid in taxes, because of the practice of
basing deferred payments on a percentage of present salary.
42WASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 115.
43Mallery v. Managers' Securities Co., supra note 41. A complicated method of
alleged indirect compensation is set forth in Prospectus of the Phillips Petroleum
Co., Feb. 7, 1957, p. 17.
44HALL, EFFECTS OF TAXATION: EXECUTIVE CONMPFNSATION AND RETIREMENT PLANS

70-84 (1951).
451d. at 38.
46Lasser and Rothschild, Deferred Compensation for Executives, Harv. Bus.

Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1955, p. 89.
47Ibid.
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It has been observed that deferred compensation plans, because
they provide for the loss of deferred benefits if the executive prematurely terminates his employment, reduce the mobility of executives; an executive desiring to change positions will need considerably
more money if he is to compensate for the loss of deferred benefits
from his present position. In this way deferred payment plans may
produce a frustrated, dissatisfied management because of their tendency
4
to "trap" the executive in the corporation. 1
One further method of compensation is available: expense accounts. Information is rare on this method, and the extent of its
use and the amounts received can only be suggested. Newsweek
reports: "As the officer of a Detroit firm puts it: 'Give a man membership in a country club and don't crowd him too much regarding
whom he is entertaining, and you've given him a nontaxable fringe
benefit.' "4, Life adds, "What the smaller executives can do by indirection, the boss of the firm can do without any beating around the
bush at all. In fact the expense account is a recognized way of rewarding executives .... "o These rewards include town or hotel apartments, hunting lodges, yachts, airplanes, country dub memberships,
51
meals, and Miami conventions at appropriate seasons.
The Incentive Function
Management compensation policies are supported by management
on the basis of their incentive value. 52 This is particularly true when
compensation is largely in the form of a bonus,53 although additional
reasons sometimes stated are to obtain and retain executives and to
relate compensation to corporate earnings. 54 The validity of varying
compensation levels as an incentive device is not neatly proved or disproved; judicial approval of incentive devices accepts their validity
as axiomatic. There are some within the ranks of management who
rate compensation at less than the customary value and place greater
48DRucKErR, THE PRAcrIcE OF MANAGEMENT 152

(1954).

49May 20, 1957, pp. 87, 91.
5.oMar. 9, 1953, pp. 140, 145.
51Id., p. 140.
215-37 (1951).
op. cit. supra note 9, at 197. See General Motors Ann. Rep. 33 (1955),
in which, in speaking of the bonus plan, it is stated: "Its purpose is to provide
incentives and reward eligible employees who contribute to the success of the
52See

COPELAND, TnE EXECUTIVE AT WORK

5

sBAKER,

business . ... "
54BAKER, op.

cit. supra note 9, at 247.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss4/3
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emphasis upon personal association, psychological identification, and
participation. 55 Others observe that those engaging in basic research
over a period of years, whose discoveries may lead to immense profits,
receive no incentive compensation but that one who tinkers with the
56
organizational apparatus does.
However, if compensation functions as an incentive device it may
presumably be measured by profits. That is, the greater the compensation the greater should be the profits. Of course other factors, as,
for example, the extent of responsibility, will affect compensation;
still, they should not affect industry averages or comparisons in
those instances in which managerial challenge is approximately equal.
The examinations of corporate compensation which have been
made produce considerable scepticism about its incentive value. Professor John Baker of Harvard, after an extensive inquiry, found that
"statistically, no significant relationship or correlation could be discovered between executive compensation and earnings."57 The same
writer found that the argument that bonus payments are made as an
incentive supplement to a small salary is without factual support: a
survey of 155 corporations indicated that of those with assets of over
$30,000,000 paying no bonus the average salary for executives was
$53,000; corporations paying salary and bonus paid an average salary
of $54,000 and total compensation of S107,500. Hence bonus payments did not supplement small salaries.5s
If compensation functions as an incentive device there should be
a lack of stability and a fluctuation of total payments varying with
profits. The practice, however, has been for executive compensation
to remain relatively stable and to decline only slightly in less profitable
years; years of increased profit are usually followed by increased compensation. Professor Baker found the total compensation of the three
highest paid executives in corporations with assets in excess of S178,000,000 to be $251,000 in 1928, $243,000 in 1931, $210,000 in 1934,
and $236,000 in 1936. For large corporations with less than $178,000,000 in assets the figures were $182,000, $191,000, $150,000, and
$185,000 in the same years. 59 The decline in compensation is hardly
55E.g.,

BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 139-60
56DRUCKER, THE PRAcrIcE OF MANAGEMENT 151 (1954).

(1950).

57Baker, Executive Compensation Compared with Earnings, Harv. Bus. Rev..
Winter 1936, pp. 213, 224.
5SBaker, Incentive Compensation Plans for Executives, Harv. Bus. Rev., Autumn

1936, pp. 44, 54-55.
5
9Baker, Executive Compensation Payments by Large and Small Industrial
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commensurate with the reduced corporate income of the depression
years.
Total compensation to executives remained relatively stable in
spite of the reduction of the number of corporations paying a bonus
from 70.9% in 1928 to 28.6% in 1935.60 This occurred because the
elimination of bonus payments was often accompanied by salary increases; one half of the 138 largest corporations maintained or increased salaries to managers during the depression years. 61
The decline in bonus payments during the depression was due
partly to lack of sufficient profit to provide for a bonus fund; however, some corporations eliminated their bonus plans. 62 If bonus
plans are used for incentive purposes it is rather incongruous to eliminate them during years of decreased profits when most corporations
are seeking ways to increase income.
Ironically, bonus plans were re-established immediately after the
second world war; an American Management Association survey reported that the number of corporations with existing bonus plans for
executives increased from 20% in 1945 to 40% in 1949.63 Fortune
estimates that total managerial bonus rewards increased from
$330,000,000 in 1947 to $615,000,000 in 1956.64 This occurred in a
period of increased national prosperity during which the increase
in corporate income was probably unrelated to management activity.
The elimination of bonus plans in a period when profits are needed
and their re-establishment when profits are likely to occur does not
support their incentive characteristics.
Other methods of compensation reveal the same inconsistency between the incentive function and the amount of payment. Although
detailed studies are unavailable, fragmentary evidence supports this
conclusion. The Ford bonus plan was adopted just after the second
world war in a period of increasing prosperity and appreciating
values. The American Woolen Company established a pension plan
benefiting its chief executive only one year before his retirement by
providing him with an annual pension of $54,000.65 Although perCompanies, 53 Q.J. ECON. 404, 429 (1939).

Gold. at 431. Corporations studied were those with assets of over $100,000,000.
GFrederich, Big Salaries and Bounses, 238 NORTH AmERICAN REviEW 225 (1934).
EXEcUTIVE SALARIES AND BONUS PLANS 20, 183 (1938).
GPatton, Current Practices in Executive Compensation, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.
62BAKER,

1951, pp. 56 , 61.
4Fortune, Dec. 1956, pp. 127, 130. It is also reported that bonus payments
soon are viewed as vested rights.
6sFogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948).
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haps an appropriate award for prior underpaid years, such a contract
cannot be supported on an incentive basis.
Ancillary Problems
The most prominent problem accompanying managerial compensation is the failure to reveal to shareholders the amounts paid to management. One study of twenty-four steel corporations for the period
1928-1936 revealed that only four of the ten corporations having a
bonus plan reported to shareholders the amount of the annual payments to management. Few of the plans had been approved by shareholders, and often their existence was suggested only by a stray balance
sheet item. 66 The bonus plans of thirty large industrial corporations
adopted just prior to the second world war were not mentioned in the
company reports of fourteen. 67 The large payments to Bethlehem
Steel executives, an average of $814,993 a year to the president from
1918 to 1930, were not reported to shareholders,6s nor were the payments to the management of the American Tobacco Company 69 and
some payments under the General Motors plan.70 The National City
Bank of New York bonus fund, providing that from annual profits
an amount equal to 8% of the capital should be set aside for shareholders and that 20% of the remaining profits should be distributed
to the management, was adopted without shareholder approval, and
the amounts received by executives were never revealed.71
Securities legislation has now produced disclosure of managerial
compensation for corporations within the jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The effectiveness of these disclosure
requirements may be questioned; based upon the theory that disclosure will permit the shareholder to protect himself, obstacles are
present in the proxy system and in the reluctance of the judiciary to
interfere with the amount of compensation. However, this problem
of secrecy remains for corporations not within the commission's
72
jurisdiction.
66BAKER, EXECUTIVE SALARIES AND BONUS PLANS 155

(1938).

67d at 200.
6SVASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
(rev. ed. 1951).
691d. at 387. $729,000 in 1929 and $1,284,000 in 1930 to the president.

383

7OWinkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 974-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
71WASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 68, at 395.
,2Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 619 (1951). Many large corporations need not
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A second problem arises in accounting and computation procedures. Determination of the basis for a bonus fund based upon a
percentage of the profits may induce management to manipulate
accounting procedures to produce greater profits and a larger bonus.
Directors of General Motors were held liable for over $2,000,000 because of accounting errors.7 3 The bonus fund of the American Tobacco
Company was miscomputed to the extent of $2,018,03374 and the
directors of the National City Bank of New York were declared liable
for $1,70,703 for miscalculation of the bonus fund.75 In situations in
which management controls the corporation and can resolve any conflict as to the manner of treatment of transactions, the competing interests of management and shareholders are not submitted to an
independent judgment. Although the SEC has compelled the aura
of secrecy to be lifted in a limited segment with respect to the amount
of managerial compensation, the primary corrective device at work
in the area of accounting discretion is the standardization of accounting procedures. With a- trend established in many companies toward
boards of directors composed primarily of inside directors, the shareholders must rely to an increasing extent upon the integrity and
discretion of the recipient of the bonus to determine the components
of the income upon which that bonus is computed. Management is
evidently not always eager to adopt standardized accounting practices
or to submit its determinations to the scrutiny of independent
auditors.76
The interest of shareholders in dividends can conflict with the
interest of management in compensation. A shareholder's proposal
to reduce salaries of executives earnings more than $25,000 a year proportionate to any reduction in corporate earnings or dividends was
opposed by the management of Loew's, Inc., on the basis that the
management might not be responsible for the decline in earnings and
comply with the disclosure provisions of the SEC statutes, e.g., Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., Aluminum Co. of America, and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
73Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
74Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), aJ'd w/o opinion, 263 App. Div.
815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Ist Dep't 1941).
75Gallin v. National City Bank, 155 Misc. 880, 903, 281 N.Y. Supp. 795, 819 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
76See, e.g., the opposition of management to a shareholder's proposal for independent auditors in Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Transamerica Corp., 163
F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947). See also Weinberg, A Corporation Director Looks at His
Job, 27 HARv. Bus. Ry. 585 (1949), for a statement of the desirability of outside
directors.
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dividends. 7 7 Another proposal by a shareholder of Pan American
Airways Corporation to limit the bonus compensation fund to the
amount of distributed dividends was opposed as an unwise restriction
8
of the directors' judgment.7
The possibility of fortuitous "incentive compensation" payments
may be illustrated by the American Woolen Company situation. In
1933 the market price of wool doubled, which enabled the company
to earn $7,000,000 profit after seven years of deficit amounting to a
net loss of $23,000,000. However, the unexpected profits permitted
a bonus payment of $600,000 to three officers in addition to their
salary payments of $165,000.79

The difficulty of establishing a basis for compensation is obvious.
Some writers have urged that statistical data on average payments by
industry, size, sales, and profits should be used as the basis for compensation. 0 At the present time neither prevailing industrial standards related to the data nor competitive factors appear to be the basis
for the measurement of compensation. 81 Indeed, the data frequently
is not available in detail, and, when it is, there is no indication of
current widespread use.
CORPORATE CONTROL

A student of political parties once declared that ultimate control
of a party flows to those who are able to control the organizational apparatus.8 2

The same phenomenon occurs in corporate organization.

Of course, in our economic and property ideas, shareholders, as owners,
exercise ultimate control over corporations. The operational decisions
are necessarily made by managers, but this group is observed and
checked by the directors, who are the chosen representatives of the
shareholders. Basic decisions of the managers that require financing
will have to face the further test of the judgment of the market place,
77See WASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 68, at 49, n.48.

7sIbid.
71 (1938).
8oSee Howe, Price Tags for Executives, Harv. Bus. Rev. May-June 1956, p. 94;
Patton, Building on the Executive Compensation Survey, Harv. Bus. Rev., MayJune 1955, p. 84.
SiSee Towl, Patterns of Executive Compensation, Harv. Bus. Rev., July 1951,
pp. 25, 27.
79BAKER, EXECUTIVE SALARIES AND BONUS PLANS

82see

OSTROGORSKI,

DEMOCRACY

AND THE ORGANIZATION

OF POLITICAL PARTIES

(1908).
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where stem and conservative financiers will give a practical judgment
by lending or refusing to lend to the corporation.
This theory purports to state the basis of corporate activity, and
society accepts this basis as desirable. To believe that this theory is
descriptive of all forms of corporate practice is illusory. It may be
an accurate description of nineteenth century corporations or small
corporations of today; it inadequately describes present large scale
corporate institutions. The exercise of financial control by a group
that owns a small fraction of stock is a familiar picture.
Modem developments have produced still another control group
of greater prevalence: management. Many factors contributed to the
growth of managerial control: dispersion of stock ownership, inertia
of shareholders, legal limitations on shareholders' rights, the proxy
engine. The convergence of these and other factors has resulted in
managerial control of many corporations and the power of management
to determine the amount of managerial compensation.
The initial factor that makes managerial control possible is the
separation of ownership and management. Neither officers nor directors are substantial owners of stock in large corporations. In the 200
largest corporations the median percentage of stock ownership of all
officers was .32% in 1939; nonofficer directors owned a median percentage of 1.11, and the median of total management ownership was
2.11%o.3 The median value of common stock owned by 246 executives in 149 large corporations was $71,600 in 1935.84 Examination of
proxy statements of ten large corporations does not demonstrate that
stock option plans have caused a significant increase in these figures85
The investigations into the extent of management ownership may be
summarized by stating that "management, even in smaller companies,
tends to participate only to a minor extent in corporate ownership,
and that in the larger companies particularly the holdings of officers
and directors are very small indeed."88 Statements are frequently
made urging greater managerial stock ownership as a means of relating the interests of management and the corporation in increased
profits; however, the only study located indicates that there is no cor83GoRDuON, BusINEss LEADERsHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 27 (1945).

841d. at 299.
s5Union Carbide Co., Rochester 'Gas & Elec. Co., Pure Oil Co., Monsanto
Chemical Co., Household Finance Corp., Gulf Oil Co., Dow Chemical Corp.,
Dayton Power & Light Co., General Motors, Chrysler Corp.
SOGordon, Stockholdings of Officers and Directors in American Industrial Corporations, 50 Q.J. EcoN. 622, 640 (1936).
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relation between ownership by management and profits. 8 7

Lack of managerial stock holdings may only reflect the more significant development of dispersion of stock ownership. In 1900 the
total capital stock in all corporations in the United States was
$62,000,000,000, and this stock was owned by 4,400,000 book stockholders; in 1928 $92,000,000,000 of stock was owned by 18,000,000
book owners.8 8 In 1955 the shareholdings in 857 large publicly held
corporations numbered 22,000,000; the number of persons owning
stock had risen in that year to over 9,000,000, an increase of 86%
since 1927. 9 In many corporations this diffusion of ownership has
eliminated concentrated holdings. The largest stockowner in the
Pennsylvania Railroad, for example, owned only .3% of the total
stock. The combined ownership of the twenty largest shareholders
amounted to only 2.7% of the outstanding stock. 90 This situation is
found extensively in modern corporations, and the general trend
of dispersion of ownership has been a continuing development in
this century. 91
This trend of dispersion, which means that more people are sharing
in ownership, could mean that the basis of control has been diffused
if there existed active, representative directors. Just the contrary is
true: the boards are frequently either inactive and mere formalities
or they are officer dominated. 92 As early as twenty years ago officers
constituted 36% of the membership of the boards of 155 giant corporations9" and composed 43% of the board membership of the 84 industrial corporations in the group.94 A selective study of 25 of these
industrial corporations reveals the following distribution of 372 directors: 191 officers, 56 bankers, 69 important stockholders, 56 miscellaneous. 95
When boards are not composed of a large proportion of officers
the problem of inactivity of directors or of officer domination is still
present. In Professor Robert Gordon's study of business leadership
he observes:

96

87BAKER, EXECUTIVE SALARIES AND BONUS PLANS

94-95 (1938).

88BERLE and MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

56 (1937).

8gForbes, Sept. 1, 1957, p. 15.
9OBERLE and MEANS, op. cit. supra note 88, at 48.

9See

KIMMEL, SHARE OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES

(1952).

92Bates, The Board of Directors, 19 HARV. Bus. REV. 72 (1940).
93GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 119

(1945).

941d. at 119.

951d. at 122.
9o6d. at 131.
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"For the majority of the corporations studied, the available
evidence strongly suggests that ratification of management proposals by the board is largely a formality. The great majority
of executives interviewed stated or implied that their boards
were 'passive' or that approval of management recommendations was 'nominal' or 'automatic.'"
By "passive" he means that the board does not actively exercise
an independent power of veto or approval over management decisions.
The judgment of still another group that could limit the power
of management, although perhaps only slightly regarding compensation, is the judgment of the market place. However, even this traditional restraint is disappearing: the corporate necessity for new
capital solicited from the market place has been solved by "growing
their own." Profits and funds from depreciation reserves have permitted corporations to finance expansion from internal sources to such
an extent that, in a sense, they could dispense with shareholders. Mr.
Owen D. Young of General Electric replied "that is right" when
asked, "[Y]our general experience parallels that of Mr. Stettinius'
company [U. S. Steel] in that from your internal sources, after you
had arrived at this period of relative maturity, you could do the
financing without tapping outside savings?"' a When asked, "General
Motors is virtually a self-contained unit in the sense that it has little
or no need to go to the public markets for financing?" Mr. Sloan replied, "That is absolutely correct." 98
This process of internal financing continues. In the eleven-year
period 1947-1957 American corporations received $206,000,000,000 in
profits after taxes, of which $103,000,000,000 was distributed as dividends and $103,000,000,00U was retained by the corporations. 99 These
savings permitted corporations in 1956, for example, to finance
$36,000,000,000 of expansion by $24,800,000,000 from internal savings
and to utilize external sources for only $11,500,000,000.00 During the
eight-year period 1946-1953, $150,000,000,000 was spent by all American businesses for capital expenditures. Of this amount 64% was
internally financed, 18% was raised by current bank borrowing, 12%
was provided by bonds and notes, and 6% was secured by the sale of
97Quoted in Chase, CapitalNot Wanted, 180 HARPEo's 225, 231 (1940).
9BIbid.
99U. S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr

494, Table 615 (1958).

bold. at 497, Table 620.
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stock. 1° 1 This development has made the shareholder and the financier almost unnecessary, and the restraint of the judgment of the
market place constitutes a factor of decreasing importance as a limitation upon the power of management.
In addition to the shareholder's weakened economic position,
severe legal limitations are placed upon his power to counteract the
power position of management. Early incorporation practices placed
stringent limits upon the power of the corporation and gave extended
rights to shareholders.102 The competition of states to secure corporations has caused a reversal of this situation, producing simple and
flexible incorporation statutes that weaken the power of investors.1° 3
The legal changes have been legion:104 the disappearance of the
power to remove directors at will, the introduction of nonvoting stock
and blank stock, the exceptions to the pre-emptive right doctrine, the
power to reclassify rights of shares, the use of voting trusts, and the
authorization of corporations to own stock, which results in holding
company control. All of these changes have had the effect of increasing the power of management and decreasing the power position
of the individual shareholders. Professor Dodd comments:105
"Many of these developments have been necessary in order
to adapt the business corporation to modern industrial and
financial conditions, though some of them, such as the abolition
of preemptive rights, are easier to reconcile with an unorthodox theory that corporate managements hire capital, than
with our traditional assumption that shareholders, as owners
of corporate capital, hire managers."
The
ment is
lead to
quently

most recent limitation on shareholders' power over managein the area of derivative suits. Because this type of suit may
a large personal settlement with the plaintiff, which fremay dispose of the matter more easily from the viewpoint of

'01BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 37-38
102See BERLE and MEANS, op. cit. supra note 88, at 127-38.

(1954).

103See
Caplin, ShareholderNominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage, 39 VA. L. REV. 141 (1953); Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business
Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 34, 57 (1936); Hornstein, Legal
Controls for Intracorporate Abuse -Present and Future, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 405,

431-32 (1941).
l04BERL and MEANS, Op. cit. supra note 88, detail these changes at 127-206.
1OSDodd, The Modern Corporation,Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1941).
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management than does a trial, whatever the merits of the claim, the
procedure may be readily abused. Although the most obvious remedy
would be to prohibit unsupervised private settlements and thus reduce the motive for personal gain, the states have not always followed the federal courts in this procedure. 0 6 To prevent the abuses
1 7
of the derivative suit the trend is to limit the power to begin the suit. 0
An initial limitation results from the contemporaneous ownership rule,
requiring the shareholder to have owned the stock at the time the
wrong occurred. 08 The strength of the derivative suit is further
diluted by recent "security for expenses" legislation. 10 9 This legislation requires that shareholders owning less than a specified percentage
of stock must post security for the expenses of the defendant corporation and officers, including expenses for attorney's fees." 0 Many of
the states adopting this legislation already have statutes authorizing
indemnification of management for expenses incurred in derivative
suits. 1' The constitutionality of the security for expenses legislation
has been sustained, 11 2 and it has been held that the state statutes apply
3
to suits brought in federal courts."
It is ironic that the legal limitations upon the investor resulting
from the liberalized corporation statutes have been supported on the
ground that the shareholder's derivative suit and his new right to
vote by proxy 1 4 would protect him. 1 5 However, use of proxies has
not constituted an effective method of managerial control by shareholders. It is obvious that the use of a proxy will demand, as a
minimum, complete and reliable disclosure of information upon
lorFED. R. Civ. P. 23 (e) requires court approval of settlements and notice to all
shareholders. A rule that the shareholder holds the proceeds of a settlement in
trust for the corporation would limit the motivation for personal gain. See Young
v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945).
l07See Caplin, supra note 103, at 148.
'0sE.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. §14:3-16 (Supp. 1958); N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW 61; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1321 (1953).
109E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §14:3-15 (Supp. 1958); N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW §61-b;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (1953).

lioSee Note, 52 COLUM. L. Rv. 267 (1952).

"'Caplin, supra note 103, at 148. See also Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders'
Derivative Suits: How Far Is California's New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound
Regulation?,37 CALIF. L. Rxv. 399 (1949).
"12Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Lapchak v. Baker,
298 N.Y. 89, 80 N.E.2d 751 (1948).
"'Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
"14See Axe, CorporateProxies,41 MICH. L. Riv. 38 (1942).
"15Hornstein, The Future of Corporate Control, 63 HAuv. L. Rzv. 476 (1950).
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which to base a decision. Yet state law regulating disclosure and the
n
solicitation of proxies is virtually nonexistent,16
and regulation is
limited to those corporations within the jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.117

The information available to a shareholder who is not protected
by the commission has been examined for industrial corporations
traded on the New York Curb Exchange on an unlisted basis. The
proxy solicitation material used by eighty-eight of these corporations
for shareholder meetings to elect directors did not reveal the names
of the nominees in 84% of the meetings; in 97% of the cases there
was no disclosure of management remuneration, and 95% of the material contained no disclosure of management's security holdings., 8
In one case investigated, the proxy statement was printed on the back
of the dividend check, so that endorsing the check gave management
a proxy unless the endorser specifically stated otherwise119
Corporations obligated to comply with the disclosure and proxy
solicitation requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must
make extensive disclosures to shareholders. Regulations promulgated
by the commission 12o require management to furnish, in its proxy
solicitation statement, the amount of compensation paid to officers
and directors in direct remuneration, pensions, and retirement benefits and deferred payments to be made, as well as the purchase and
market price of stock options. If action is to be taken with respect
to any compensation plan, the proxy solicitation statement must include the material details of the plan and the amounts which would
have been received by directors and officers during the last fiscal
year if the plan had been in operation. There must be an indication
that management is soliciting the proxy, and the matters to be voted
upon must be separately stated, with an opportunity for the shareholder to specify approval or disapproval of each issue. Solicitation of
proxies is prohibited unless each person solicited is furnished with
a proxy statement containing the required information.
Shareholders are accorded some active rights under the regulations. 1 21 If a shareholder desires to solicit proxies, management is re116Emerson and Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective
Stockholder Participation,59 YALE L.J. 635 (1950).
117Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881, 892 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78 (1), (n)
(1952); 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-2 (Supp. 1958).
(1951).
1191bid.
12017 C.F.R. §240.14a, sched. 14A (Supp. 1958).
ll8Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 619

12117

C.F.R. §240.14a-7,8 (Supp. 1958).
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quired to furnish him a list of security holders or to mail to the
security holders, at the expense of the shareholder, the material that
he furnishes. This rule is designed to meet "the problems, and sometimes nearly practical impossibility under state law, of securing a list
of stockholders' names and addresses .... .. 122 Another provision
obligates management to include in its solicitation material a proposal of a shareholder if it is a proper subject. There is also a prohibition against a refusal to vote solicited proxies to counteract the
management practice of simply not voting unfavorable responses. 123
A series of amendments to the regulations in 1954 restricted rather
than expanded shareholders' rights under the proxy section. 124 The
period of time prior to management proxy solicitation by which a
shareholder must submit a proposal that is to be included in the
management proxy was lengthened from thirty to sixty days in order
to give management more time to study the proposal.125 This time
extension has been criticized on the basis that the shorter time has
not placed a burden on management. Only 1.9% of the yearly average
of 1,660 proxy statements filed with the commission from 1943 to
1952 contained shareholder proposals, and 93% of these proposals
were recurring, identical proposals concentrated in a few major
areas. 26 The effect of the longer period of time is to require a shareholder to submit his proposal prior to the time he receives the corpo27
ration's annual report.
The shareholder proposal rule prior to 1954 permitted management to omit the proposal if it had failed to gain 3% of the vote at
its last submission. This rule was amended to permit omission if the
proposal had failed to receive 6% at its second submission and 10%
at its third vote within the preceding three years. The effect of the
amendment is to eliminate over one half of the proposals. 28 Lewis
2

12 EMFRSON and LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 44

(1954); see FLA. STAT.
§608.39 (1957) for the Florida requirements. See also Note, 26 U. CINc. L. REv. 288

(1957).
123EMERSON and LATcHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 43

(1954).

12 4Bayne, Caplin, Emerson, Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making
Process: The 1954 Amendments, 40 VA. L. Rxv. 387 (1954).
l25The rule states that a proposal submitted "more than 60 days in advance of
a day corresponding to the first date on which management proxy soliciting material was released to security holders in connection with the last annual meeting
of security holders shall prima fade be deemed to have been submitted a reasonable
time before solicitation." 17 C.F.R. §14a-8a (Supp. 1958).
l26Bayne, Caplin, Emerson, Latcham, supra note 124, at 393.
127EMERSON and LATCHAm, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 97 (1954).
128 See Emerson, Some Sociological and Legal Aspects of Institutional and In-
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D. Gilbert, who is dedicated to attending shareholders' meetings with
a view toward greater shareholder participation and who, in recent
years, has introduced 75% of all shareholder proposals under this rule,
insists that proposals receiving only a small percentage of the votes
are nonetheless very effective in inducing management to satisfy
shareholders.

129

Perhaps the most critical change by the amendments for the purpose of control over compensation involves the decision in Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Transamerica Corp.1 3 ° In that case
management attempted to use a bylaw requiring that notice of amendments be contained in the notice of the meeting to prevent shareholders from voting on a proposed amendment. The rule governing
shareholder proposals required the subject to be one "which is a
'
proper subject for action by the security holders."131
The corporation
argued that the Delaware corporation law permitted the charter to
delineate the powers of directors and shareholders and that its charter
vested all powers of the corporation in the board of directors; consequently, the shareholder's proposal failed the "proper subject matter"
test of the rule. The court refused to sustain this argument and
forced the corporation to include the shareholder's proposal, since
Delaware law did not exclude shareholder action in this area.
The Securities and Exchange Commission amended its rules: the
prior rule required the inclusion of a shareholder's proposal "which
is a proper subject for action by the security holders"; 13 2 the amended
rule permits management to exclude the proposal if "the proposal
as submitted is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper
subject for action by security holders"1 33 or if "the proposal consists
of a recommendation or request that management take action with
respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business
operations of the issuer.' 34 A recent proposal by a shareholder of
Standard Oil Company to appoint a committee to investigate executive compensation was excluded by the commission under the "proper
dividual ParticipationUnder SEC's ShareholderProposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 528,

543 (1957).
l29See GILBERT, DIVIDENDS AND DEMOCRACY 128-36 (1956).

130163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
13117 C.F.R. §240.14a-8a (1949).

1321bid.
13d. §240.14a-8-C-l.

This is not a significant change; it merely states the

Transamericarule.
1341d. §240.14a-8-C-5.
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subject" rule."35 Gilbert fears that these provisions may easily be interpreted to exclude executive compensation from the area of shareholder proposals.
Proxy solicitation legislation is designed to correct the relative
power positions of management and opposing shareholders by insuring a flow of information to shareholders. "It was the intent of
Congress to require fair opportunity for the operation of corporate
suffrage. The control of great corporations by a very few persons was
16
the abuse at which Congress struck in enacting Section 14 (a)." 3
The protection afforded, however, does not seriously affect the practical problems facing shareholders' attempts either to remove current
management or to limit managerial power and compensation. An
attempt to change the management involves expenses for attorneys,
accountants, public relations experts, professional proxy solicitors,
37
printing, and even entertainment.
In any contest for proxy votes on proposed policies, management
has great advantages. The inertia of most shareholders provides the
initial advantage to management and makes most shareholder meetings a formality."3 8 If proxy solicitation is necessary, management may
employ professional solicitors whose contacts with brokers permit
easy access to lists of beneficial owners of stock held by the broker. In
one recent contest, for example, forty-five per cent of the outstanding
shares were registered in the names of brokers. 3 9 In addition, management may use corporate funds to finance its campaign if the issue
40
is one of policy as distinct from personnel.
"5See Bayne, The Basic Rationale of ProperSubject, 34 U. DEr. L.J. 575, 598
(1957).
136Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 874 (1948); 20 So.
CAL. L. REv. 355 (1947); 96 U. PA. L. REv. 286 (1947).
'37AANow and BINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 485-90 (1957).
The recent New York Central contest cost management $875,000 and the insurgents
$1,308,773.
'3sLatcham and Emerson, Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder Democracy,
4 W. Rxs. L. REy. 5 (1952). For a humorous account of a General Motors' shareholders meeting see The New Yorker, June 17, 1950, p. 52.
139Emerson and Latcham, Further Insight into More Effective Stockholder Participation: The Sparks-Withington Proxy Contest, 60 YALE L.J. 429, 438, 450 (1951).
Rules of the N. Y. Stock Exchange provide for equality of treatment in proxy
contests if members of the Exchange know of an impending contest.
140Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D. Del. 1941); Empire So. Gas Co. v. Gray, 29 Del. Ch. 95, 46 A.2d 741 (Ch. 1946); In re Zickl, 73
N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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The proxy machinery has hardly secured shareholders the right
of representation.141 The lack of active leadership in opposition to

management frequently vests corporate control by default in those
currently in power.1 42 Sometimes management's power is literally by
default through the simple expedient of not soliciting proxies. This
results in lack of a quorum and thus perpetuates the control of existing
management and exempts the corporation from complying with the
Commission's solicitation requirements.143 The present system has
4
been summarized by one writer as follows:1 4

"However, as presently employed - with the proxy machinery completely dominated by the managers of industry,
with the nominations for directors being made by the managers
themselves, and with the shareholders being denied the opportunity of making independent nominations in management's
proxy statements - the proxy system of voting has become an
anti-democratic device, destructive of any real system of checks
and balances against possible managerial abuse, and operating
in contravention of our fundamental notions of fair play."
The recent growth in institutional ownership has further accentuated the concept of the hiring of capital by management. Investment
funds holding stock in operating corporations are interested primarily
in the market performance of the stock for the benefit of their own
stockholders. These funds now have total assets of over $9,500,000,5
000.1 An

analysis of the voting behavior of these investment funds on

shareholder proposals beneficial to the investors reveals that "investment companies are doing little or nothing toward fulfillment of their
,"146
obligation as shareholder participants in corporate affairs .
141For

the problems involved in gaining information from management see GIL(1956).

BERT, DIVIDENDS AND DEMOCRACY

142Bernstein and Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some

Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L.
143EMERSON and LATCHAM,

SHAREHOLDER

REV.

DEMOCRACY

226 (1940).
48 (1954). In 1952, 24%

of the companies registered with the SEC did not file proxy material. A 1941
recommendation by the SEC would have obligated corporations to furnish in
annual reports the information required to be disclosed in proxy solicitations. At
present, however, this information still need not be included in the annual report.
See Emerson and Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective
Stockholder Participation,59 YALE L.J. 635, 675 (1950).
144Caplin, supra note 103, at 151.
145U.S. News ScWorld Report, May 31, 1957, p. 124.
146Emerson, Some Sociological and Legal Aspects of Institutional and Individual
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Thus shareholders are further removed from the exercise of control
over management.
The legal limitations summarized above and the practical obstacles involved in competing with managerial control of proxy machinery have resulted in extensive control of corporations by management. It is difficult to measure the exact proportion of corporations
controlled by management, for this measurement involves a lengthy
empirical study. Berle and Means, after examining the 200 largest
nonfinancial corporations, concluded that, in 1929, 44% of the corporations were management controlled, representing 58% of the wealth
of the corporations studied.247 Another 21%, representing 22% of
the corporate wealth, were controlled by a legal device, as, for example,
a voting trust. This type of control did not represent majority or
minority control and probably meant, in effect, management control.
Thus at least 58% and possibly 80% of the corporate wealth of the 200
largest corporations was controlled by management.
A later study of 155 of the largest 200 corporations indicates a
greater frequency of managerial control. 48 The two most dominant
control groups were other corporations, a situation more prevalent in
utilities and rails, and management, which was the situation most
prevalent in industrial corporations. There is evidence that the number of corporations controlled by management has increased.349 Peter
Drucker, a philosopher turned corporation consultant, has recently
observed: 150
"[T]he corporation has become autonomous. The stockholders
are only one special group of outsiders with a claim to profits.
They neither control nor run the property of the corporation;
they know nothing about it in most cases. Management is
autonomous too. It appoints its own successors without even
consulting stockholders. It is rarely removed by stockholders
except after a catastrophe such as bankruptcy. In the larger
corporation with widely distributed stock ownership it would
be impossible for the stockholders to try to control or to oust
the corporation executives, even if they wanted to. ManageParticipationUnder the SEC's ShareholderRule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 528, 547 (1957).
4
1 7BERLE and MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 94 (1937).
'4sSee Gordon, Ownership by Management and Control Groups in the Large
Corporation,52 Q.J. ECON. 367, 387 (1938).
149See BERI.=, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 25-42 (1954).
25ODrucker, The Future of the Corporation, 185 HAI'ER's 644, 646 (1942).
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ment is thus neither controlled by the legal owners of the
properties nor responsible to them."
Shareholders need not be the only check upon management. Competition by and for managers could function as a device preventing
excessive managerial control and compensation. Individual actions,
however, are increasingly submerged by large and complex structures.
Entry into management ranks by outsiders is increasingly difficult.
Although the growth of the managerial group has been viewed as a
democratic, professional movement, 151 our present knowledge indicates that social mobility, the possibility of new social groups entering
the managerial group, is much less than we had supposed.152 Fortune
observes that "there are also signs that an increasing proportion of
younger managers, unlike their elders, are sons of men who were
themselves executives. Thus there arises the unhealthy possibility of
a self-perpetuating managerial elite."1.53 It also reports that there is
surprisingly little circulation among companies by executives.
Who controls the wages of management? It is accurate to say
that it is usually management. There is the possibility of danger in
such a situation from the viewpoint of the shareholder and that of
the public.
JUDICIAL CONTROL

The rules governing the authority for and validity of compensation paid to executives derive from corporation, contract, and agency
doctrines. Attacks upon compensation will focus upon the lack of
authority of the corporation as to the amount of compensation paid
or the particular manner of payment; payment may be disputed on
the basis of the presence or validity of a contract; the propriety of
the acts of directors and officers may be challenged because of bad
faith, self-dealing, or fraud. A violation in any of these areas may
result in a characterization of waste, spoilation of assets, gift, or fraud.
The precise question in dispute, excessiveness of compensation, for
example, will usually not be given isolated analysis by the court but
will be related to and confused with problems of corporate authority
or the propriety of the acts of the corporation's agents in terms of
self-dealing. Another confusion found in the cases results from the
151XValker and Riera, Wall Street, Main Street & Co., 179
52
1
See 22 COMMENTARY 367 (1956).
153Fortune, Jan. 1955, pp. 84, 122.
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failure to make legal distinctions between closely held and publicly
held corporations, even though the courts arrive at different results in
the two situations. A further complicating factor is whether a director, officer, or officer-director is involved.
The authority of the corporation to pay its directors is often
declared to be dependent upon a statutory, charter, or bylaw provision.154 Many courts hold only that there is a presumption that
directors serve without pay in the absence of an express agreement. 55
The corporation's authority to fix the compensation of officers may
be exercised through the directors. 56 The basis of authority for payment of compensation to officer-directors has presented a traditional
problem area and is often merged with contract doctrine.
The Florida Supreme Court has stated that "directors of a corporation are precluded from fixing their own compensation for services, to be rendered as offcers of the corporation, unless they are ex57
pressly authorized to do so by the charter or by the stockholders."'
Most jurisdictions, however, consider the problem of officer-director
compensation in contractual terms and permit payment when there
is an express agreement between the officer-director and the corporation as to the authority of the board of directors.15 Even in the
absence of an agreement, the presumption that an officer-director
serves without compensation may be overcome by evidence of the performance of services beyond those of a director and an understanding
that the director-officer expected payment. 59 If all the formalities
are ignored, however, even ratification by the board of directors or
shareholders will not preclude corporate recovery of the compen60
sation.1
The area of greatest difficulty regarding officer-directors in those
& Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914).
15~ox v. Artic Placer Min. & Mill. Co., 229 N.Y. 124, 128 N.E. 154 (1920);
Security Say. & Trust Co. v. Coos Bay Lumber & Coal Co., 219 Wis. 337, 263 N.W.
lndGodley v. Crandall

187 (1935).
156Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914).
2l5Redstone v. Redstone Lumber & Supply Co., 101 Fla. 226, 232, 133 So. 882,

884 (1931).
25sRansome Concrete Mach. Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 28 (2d Cir. 1922); Cox v.
First Nat'l Bank, 10 Cal. App. 2d 302, 52 P.2d 524 (1935).
'59Vaught v. Charleston Nat'l Bank, 62 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1933); Johnson v.
Tri-Union Oil & Gas Co., 278 Ky. 633, 129 S.W.2d 111 (1939); Spence v. Sturgis
Steel Go-Cart Co., 217 Mich. 147, 186 N.W. 393 (1922).
60Monterey Water Co. v. Voorhees, 45 Ariz. 338, 43 P.2d 196 (1935); Fields v.
Victor Bldg. & Loan Co., 73 Okla. 207, 175 Pac. 529 (1918). But see Lewis v.
Matthews, 166 App. Div. 107, 146 N.Y. Supp. 424 (Ist Dep't 1914).
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instances in which there is an express agreement is the problem of
self-dealing. The presence of a charter or bylaw permitting the
officer-director to vote will remove this problem,161 and most courts
do not regard the officer-director's participation as self-dealing if his
vote is not necessary to secure adoption of the resolution or contract
fixing his salary.1 62 However, the officer-director may not be counted
for the purpose of determining the presence of a quorum.1 6 3 A system
of cross-voting in which each executive abstains from voting as his
compensation is being determined will not avoid the self-dealing
rule.164 The domination of a board by a single individual may cause
the court to disregard the ostensible regularity of procedure and conclude that self-dealing was present. 6
Ratification by shareholders of acts of directors will cure the deficiency of self-dealing in jurisdictions in which self-dealing contracts
are voidable at the option of the corporation but not void. 66 Even
without ratification, a self-voted contract that is only voidable may be
sustained by a showing of the director's good faith.167 The usual
effect of the "voidable" and "ratification" rules is to shift the burden
of proving the validity of the action. Although ratification will cure
the lack of authority of the board of directors under agency doctrine,
it will not preclude application of the doctrine of waste if the compen68

sation is excessive.1

The corporation's authority to provide different types of compenl6lPiccard v. Sperry Corp., 48 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), afJ'd, 152 F.2d 462
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 845 (1946); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198
Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147 (1946).
162E.g., Anderson v. Calaveras Cent. Min. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 338, 57 P.2d
560 (1936); Clark v. American Coal Co., 86 Iowa 436, 53 N.W. 291 (1892); Wellington Bull & Co. v. Morris, 132 Misc. 509, 230 N.Y. Supp. 122 (Sup. Ct. 1928), afJ'd
mem., 226 App. Div. 868, 235 N.Y. Supp. 906 (1st Dep't 1929).
163Mortensen v. Ballard, 218 Ark. 459, 236 S.W.2d 1006 (1951); Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (Ch. 1948); Newcomer v.
Mountain Springs Ice & Cold Storage Co., 63 So. Dak. 81, 256 N.W. 359 (1934).
Contra, Fountain v. Oreck's, Inc., 245 Minn. 202, 71 N.W.2d 646 (1945).
'64Mallory v. Mallory-Wheeler Co., 61 Conn. 131, 23 Atl. 708 (1891); Stoiber v.
Miller Brewing Co., 257 Wis. 13, 42 N.W.2d 144 (1950).
resMonterey Water Co. v. Voorhees, 45 Ariz. 338, 43 P.2d 196 (1935); Lillard
v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 197, 56 Atl. 254 (Ch. 1903).
:6Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup.
Ct. 1952); Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S.W. 593 (1925).
167Church v. Harnit, 35 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1929); Albrecht v. Bellinger, 8 P.2d
983 (Wash. 1932); cf. Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So.
674 (1932).
168See note 166 supra.
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sation to its officers and officer-directors appears established, and the
greatest problem is the sufficiency of the consideration by the executive in plans that provide other than a direct salary.
A judicially recognized form of incentive compensation is the
stock option plan.J69 The problems in this area are the consideration
furnished by the executive and the doctrine of pre-emptive rights.
If the option plan is designed to retain the employment of the executive by providing for the exercise of the option only during continued
' 0
employment, the corporation has received a sufficient consideration."
The option is invalid when it is not designed to retain the executiveY.1
Invalidity of the plan because of pre-emptive rights of shareholders
may easily be avoided by using authorized but unissued shares, treas17 2
ury shares, or shares purchased on the market.
173
Bonus plans, including stock bonuses, have been widely accepted
as proper methods of compensation.174 Because of the abuse of stock
bonuses by promoters there is some suspicion concerning the fair
evaluation of services rendered for the bonus. Ratification by shareholders of a bonus plan will force a shareholder to prove unreasonableness"75 if he chooses to attack the plan, a task practically impossible in publicly held corporations. Even without ratification, in the
will also be required to prove
absence of self-dealing the shareholder
6
the compensation unreasonable."7
Pension plans may be established by the corporation; the problem
of their validity centers upon whether the consideration of the execu169Harker v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1930); Diamond v.
Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Ist
Dep't 1942), 292 N.Y. 554, 54 N.E.2d 683 (1944).
17oMcQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939),
afJ'd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chem. Corp., 99 A.2d 507 (Del. Ch. 1953); Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc.,
33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
71Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1943);
Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., supra note 170.
172Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (Ch. 1941); see Drinker, The
Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 46 HARV. L. REv.
586 (1930).
173Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 39 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
'r4Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.,
supra note 173.
175Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
176Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N.W. 586 (1922);
see Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Gallin v. National City
Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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tive is past or future. An agreement to pay a pension in exchange
for future services by the executive will be sustained. 1'7 7 If the pension
is established for past services, contract doctrine will invalidate the
payment.'7 8 An agreement to render advisory and consulting services

after retirement will be sufficient, however.'7 9 Pension plans established just prior to the retirement of an officer who is the principal
beneficiary may be attacked on the doctrine of waste even though the
stated purpose of the plan is to induce the employment of other
executives. 180
A life insurance policy for $300,000 purchased by the corporation
for the benefit of the employee's family has been sustained as a benefit
to the corporation, and the employee's promise to remain with the
corporation for a specified number of years was held sufficient consideration.18 '
Compensation based upon a percentage of the profits of a corporation is sustained,182 although compensation based upon share ownership is invalid because the payments must relate to employment and
the services performed.

8 3

The primary problem of control by the judiciary over the amount
of managerial compensation may proceed in two broad areas. The
first involves the question of compliance with the provisions of the
charter and bylaws in the formality of adoption: the legal doctrines
that provide guides for judicial decisions are phrased in terms of
technical compliance with requirements of ratification by or notice to
shareholders, violation of the fiduciary relationship through selfdealing, secrecy, miscomputation, and the presence and validity of
contracts. The second area is a direct evaluation of the amount of
compensation to determine if it is excessive, unreasonable, and consti84
tutes a waste of corporate assets.
Controls that are technical in nature, such as compliance with
'77Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 69 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio C.P. 1946), modified,

84 Ohio App. 442, 84 N.E.2d 508 (1948).
l78Plowman v. Indian Ref. Co., 20 F. Supp. I (E.D. Il1. 1937).
179Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., supra note 177.
l8oFogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948).
1l8Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
182Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107
Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932); Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y.

Supp. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
l83Scott v. P. Lorillard Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 153, 154 At. 515 (Ch.), aff'd, 109 N.J.
Eq. 417, 157 Atl. 388 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931).
l84Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 3
THE WAGES OF MANAGEMENT
requirements as to quorum or notice, may be more easily and mechanically applied. Judicial limitations upon compensation have
most frequently taken the form of application of such technical
rules.8 5 One recent study reviewed forty-four cases involving closely
held corporations in which an issue of reasonableness of compensation
was presented.8 8 Classified according to a holding or strong dictum
that the compensation was reasonable or unreasonable, twenty-seven
were in the former category and seventeen in the latter. The compensation of the chief executive ranged from $1,500 to $24,800 in cases
in the reasonable list and from $3,600 to $29,076 in the unreasonable
list. Although some cases purported to use standards, such as industry
comparisons, prior compensation, and compensation of other officers
of the corporation, all but two of the cases in which compensation was
declared unreasonable involved self-dealing. Self-dealing in itself may
not be the deciding factor, since in ten cases a finding of reasonableness
was made although self-dealing was present. The importance of the
results is that in the absence of self-dealing' courts are reluctant to
find compensation unreasonable. Only one case was "found in which
the court even referred to percentages of earnings, volume of business,
or the like for the purpose of determining the propriety of executive
compensation."'187 Shrinkage of purchasing power through inflation
was mentioned in only one of the forty-four cases; 88 no case mentioned
the increased tax rates. Both of these variables are frequently argued
as justifying larger payments to management in publicly held corporations.
Attacks upon the compensation policies of large, publicly held corporations were infrequent prior to the depression, probably because
of the confluence of a number of factors, including prosperity and a
lack of information by shareholders. 8 9 The intimacy of the relationship in closely held corporations had provided information to shareholders that resulted in extensive litigation; the first attacks upon
publicly held corporations proceeded upon the theories established
by such prior litigation and were based upon allegations of self-dealing,
fraud, and excessive amounts.
l85See Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Action Against Directors, 40 Micn.

L. REv. 1125 (1942).
186WASHINGToN

and

RoTHscHILD, COMPENSATING THE CoRPORATE EXEcUTIVE

367-79

(1951).
at 370.
1BsPoutch v. National Foundry & Mach. Co., 147 Ky. 242, 143 S.W. 1003 (1912).
l89See Berendt v. Bethelehem Steel Corp., 108 N.J. Eq. 148, 154 Ad. 321 (Ch.

1871d.
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In Rogers v. Hill 90 the United States Supreme Court overcame
the reluctance of the court of appeals to interfere with the amount of
compensation and affirmed the power of a court of equity to inquire
into the compensation of managers to determine if it is excessive.
However, the self-dealing associated with the determination of excessive compensation that appears in closely held corporations does
not appear as frequently when large corporations are involved. Managers are not majority shareholders trying to convert a "partner's"
dividends into their own under the guise of compensation. 191 A greater
awareness of proper legal corporate procedures and the ability through
the proxy machinery to gain shareholder approval or ratification limits
the court's application of the technical controls. A management that
is able to control a corporation through proxy voting will have little
difficulty in establishing a board of directors apparently disinterested
in management's compensation.
Without the ability to pronounce "fraud," "bad faith," or "selfdealing," the courts find the question Is this executive being paid too
much? more designed to produce a neurosis than an answer. Although
courts express a willingness to inquire to determine if executive
salaries are excessive, the result of such an inquiry is almost invariably
to resolve the question in favor of the reasonableness of the payments.
The reliance of the courts upon the disinterested good faith of
directors when excessiveness is the issue involved is illustrated by
Gallin v. National City Bank,192 in which payments to Mr. Charles E.
Mitchell, the chief executive, of $1,156,200 in 1927, $1,417,000 in 1928,
and $1,375,534 in 1929 were upheld. The legal rationale for the decision apparently is that the directors were disinterested and acted
in good faith. Mr. Mitchell, who was employed by both a holding
and an operating company, testified that the directors of the National
City Company probably knew what the company was paying him and
that the directors of the National City Bank may not have known the
amounts the bank paid him.19 3 The shareholders were never informed

of the amount of executive compensation; indeed, the bank's earnings
were not reported to them prior to 1931.
1931).
19-289 U.S. 582 (1933).
19'For a discussion of this problem see BAKER and CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS 472 (3d ed. 1958).
192152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934), referee's report, 155 Misc.
880, 281 N.Y. Supp. 795 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
193WASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 186, at 396, n.60.
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The cases involving large corporations in which excessiveness of
compensation has been posed as an issue have consistently denied
shareholder recovery based on that theory. 9 4 The famous American
Tobacco Company bonuses, approved by shareholders through proxy
voting, survived this test. Alleging that the president's average compensation of $400,000 a year from 1929-1939 was excessive, the plaintiffs also insisted that the $230,179 paid to the president's son in 1939,
compared with $64,273 the prior year, was excessive and "due to the
discernment by the father of genius in the son."'195 The son had
worked for another corporation from 1932 to 1935, where his services
were valued at only $3,000 a year. The plaintiffs suggested that the
figures would speak for themselves, and the court replied: 96
"The figures do speak, but just what do they say as a
matter of Equity? They are immense, staggeringly so. Even
so, is that enough to compel the substitution of the Court's
judgment for that of the stockholders? Larger compensation
has been judicially approved."
The court observed:

97

"Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple with
these entangled economic problems. Indeed, their solution is
not within the juridical province. Courts are concerned that
corporations be honestly and fairly operated by its directors,
with the observance of the formal requirements of the law;
but what is reasonable compensation for its officers is primarily
for the stockholders."
The perturbing factor to the court was "finding a rational or just
gauge for reviewing these figures were I inclined to do so. No blue-

'94E.g., Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939), aff'd, 112
F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d
103 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Ist Dep't 1942), aff'd,
292 N.Y. 552, 54 N.E.2d 683 (1944); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd 263 App. Div. 814, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1st Dep't 1941).
'9sHeller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
29oid. at 671.
'971d, at 680.
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prints are furnished. The elements to be weighed are incalculable; the
imponderables, manifold. 19s
Another court declared its willingness to grant relief if the compensation was wasteful; excessive compensation, however, is merely an
error, and interference with directors' erroneous judgment would interfere with private business, causing initiative and just rewards to
disappear. 199 The courts rely, very simply, on the business judgment
rule, and the application of the rule evidences an extreme reluctance
to interfere with the amount of compensation.200 Although references
are sometimes made to assets, profits, and dividends, it is doubtful
0
that these factors are influential.2 1
Application of the standard of reasonableness has produced no
empirical results, no specific standards, only cursory comparisons of
industrial levels, and no limitation on compensation. The shareholder, ignored by management and relatively powerless in large
corporations, can expect little aid from the courts. The most favorable result of litigation is likely to be an out-of-court settlement. Past
litigation, which established some technical landmarks, and the threat
of future litigation with its attendant publicity have perhaps reduced
managerial compensation. In the final analysis managerial compensation is not controlled by shareholders; it is not controlled by directors;
it is not controlled by the courts. Its form may be altered by the tax
structure, but taxes are not a limiting control. Compensation may be
restrained by all of these elements with an assist from public opinion.
Even this latter factor is diluted by the individual American dream
of great wealth and the equation of power and wealth. The ultimate
present control is the integrity and conscientiousness of management.

1981d. at 679.
199McQuiIlen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 653 (D. Md. 1939).
20OSee Carson, supra note 185.
20See WASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 186, at 416.
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